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I.  INTRODUCTION:  THE  WORLD  ECONOMIC  SITUATION 
It was  just twenty years  ago  - the  US  Trade Expansion Act of  1962  had 
just been enacted  - that the notorious  "chicken war"  erupted at the 
time of  the  implementation of the European Community's  Common 
Agricultural Policy  (CAP).  A little more  than  a  year  later,  the 
' 
dispute ended.  It left a  bitter taste,  however,  and  was  the harbinger 
of future  transatlantic trade skirmishes  between the European 
Community  and  the  United States. 
Since  then,  two  "rounds"  of world  trade negotiations have  been held, 
whose  results have  been  the reduction of  trade barriers and  the 
establishment of procedures for  the settlement of trade disputes 
through the  GATT. 
In recent months  the EC's agricultural policy has  been challenged 
anew  in certain quarters of  the American Administration.  The  tone 
of rhetoric has  heightened. 
I  need  not remind  this knowledgeable  audience  about the  seriousness 
of  the world  economic  situation today. 
The  deeper  - and  longer  - than  - expected  US  recession continues to 
send  shock waves  throughout  the industrialized world.  High  interest 
rates and  lower  levels of demand  have restricted economic  growth on 
both sides of the Atlantic.  Business Week  predicted that the Western 
nations would  grow at a  mere  1.5%  in 1982. 2 
In 1981,  the EC  countries'  GNP  dwindled  in real terms  by nearly 1%. 
The  US  economy  grew  by  ~ess than  2%.  Inflation,  particularly in EC 
. nations,  where it averaged  12.7%  in 1981,  persists at an unacceptable 
level. 
The  worldwide  economic crisis - from  which no  one  seems  immune  - is 
affecting our relations in a  negative way. 
This crisis is accentuating protectionist pressures on  both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
On  the European side of the Atlantic,  there is a  perception that 
private interests in the United States may  be willing to turn their 
back  on  the  international trading arrangements painstakingly arrived 
at during  the past generation. 
It is particularly alarming to hear high officials testify before 
a  congressional Committee  that,  in the case of recent "unfair 
practices"  cases filed  (under Section 301  of the  US  Trade  Reform act) , 
if the  EC  Commission is found  by  GATT  to be in'the wrong,  it must 
change its policies;  but if the  US  interpretation of  the Subsidy Code 
is wrong,  the  US  will seek to change  the Code. .. 
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II.  THE  BENEFITS  OF  TRADE 
Before  I  go  into specific policy areas  in the  transatlantic trading 
relationship,  it is important to recall the benefits of international 
trade and  the  dangers  of protectionism. 
For  the European  Community  in particular,  trade is an  essential 
element of its economic  survival.  Its objectives in the trade area 
-as stated in the Treaty of Rome  signed just 25  years  ago  this  coming 
March  25  - have  been  to bring down  internal trade barriers and  ha~monize 
external tariffs,lowering  them at the  same  time. 
Europe  - more  than America  - is a  highly trade-dependent continent. 
Imports  and  exports  from  and  to third countries  (extra-EC  trade) 
constitute over  20%  of the EC's  GNP,  as  compared with  12%  for  the 
United States.  The  European nations  have  always  been  trading nations 
·-
and  their dependence  on  trade is not new. 
The  development of our cultures  and  social systems  would  not  have 
been possible without extensive and diverse commercial  exchanges 
amongst ourselves  and with the rest of the world. 
By  assuming  the  trade policy responsibilities of  10 member-states, 
the  EC  has  been able  to moderate  the protectionist pressures exercised 
on  the member-states,  all of which are subject to the  same  pressures 
domestically that the  US  government is.  For  example,  in 1980,  the 
Community  successfully resisted pressures  by European petroleum-
chemical  and most  synthetic fibre manufacturers,  when  they were  asking 4 
for  action against  US  imports.  The  challenge of the European 
institutions and  one  which  has  met with relative success is continually 
to balance inevitable protectionist pressures against desirable free- .· 
market forces. 
The process of trade liberalization,  industrial development  and 
economic  integration,  which underlies the EC,  has  brought prosperity 
and  growth to the nations of Europe. 
The  ten nations of  the EC  have  a  combined  population of  280  million 
(230 million for  US)  and  a  combined  GNP  of close to  3  trillion,  like 
the us. 
The  consolidation of  ten national economies  has  also created the world's 
largest trading entity,  and  bred a  powerful  competitor  for  the United 
States.  Together,  the United States and  the  EC  account  for  50%  of 
all world  trade. 
The  consequences of  the  economic  integration and  growing prosperity 
of the European  Community  have  been  a  series of  frictions with its 
largest trading partner,  the  United States.  This was  perhaps 
inevitable. 
Yet,  the development of the EC  has  been  supported  and  even nurtured 
by  successive  US  administrations.  This  was  a  conscious political 
decision and,  in my  opinion,was one of the great success stories of 
us  post-war diplomacy. 5 
The  United States has greatly benefitted from Europe's  growth. 
The  EC  is the  United States'  largest single export market.  American 
investment in Western European countries accounts for  over  40%  of 
total  US  private direct investment abroad,largely due  to the  inducement 
effect of European  integration. 
The  closeness of  US-EC  relations has  allowed  us  to find  solutions 
to trade disputes,  and  helped  to ensure  so far that the self-defeating 
beggar-thy-neighbour  policies of  the  1930s not re-emerge.  International 
economic  institutions such as  GATT  and  OECD  have provided the  framework 
for reconciling differences and  coordinating policy approaches.  Fidelity 
to those instrumentalities is a  sine qua  non  of economic  renewal 
on both sides of  the Atlantic.  In times of economic  turmoil,  we 
must not turn our  back  on  the underpinnings of the post-war economic 
miracle  and  challenge the very structures that have prevented the 
economic disasters of half  a  century  ··ago. 
In a  recent speech in Chicago,  Assistant Secretary of State for 
Economic  and  Business Affairs Robert Hormats  said that we  should 
"refrain from  shifting the burden of adjustment to one another," 
as  Europeans  and Americans  try to grapple with the  seemingly  intractable 
economic problems  of  the 1980s. 
That is an objective that Europe  certainly shares with America. 
This  afternoon,  I  will concentrate my  remarks  onlx on  the  economic 
aspects of  this most recent "crisis"  across  the Atlantic. III.  TRANSATLANTIC  TRADING  FRICTIONS 
In recent months,  officials from  both sides of  the Atlantic have 
engaged  in continuing discussions on  a  range of  trade  issues. 
1.  Agricultural trade 
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There  has  been  a  marked deterioration in relations between the  US 
and  the  EC  in the agricultural sector. 
Recent meetings  in Washington  in early February between  EC  Commissioners 
and  US  Cabinet officials made  that evident. 
- pressures  in the  US  Congress  are  growing; 
- there  seems  to be  a  feeling  here  that American  farmers  could 
remedy  their problems  (lowest  farm  income  in  40  years)  by 
challenging European  farm policies; 
-what is unclear is the extent·to which  the American  farmer 
himself  ascribes his troubles to European policies; 
- our differences in this area revolve  around  EC  policies on 
agricultural exports and  on  the application of  the  GATT  Subsidy 
Code; 
- formal  complaints against the EC  have  been initiated by  US 
producers of poultry,  pasta,  wheat flour,  sugar,  preserved  f~uit 
and citrus. 
We  Europeans,  believe that we  have  abided  by the rules of  GATT 
negotiated in the multilateral trade negotiations,  and which  allow 
subsidies as  long  as  they  do  not entail the acquisition of more  than an equitable market  share in third markets, 
- the volume  of our  exports has  expanded  in recent years 
because world  demand  has  risen  (for both  US  and  EC); 
- in many  sectors  the  US  has  taken a  larger  share of the 
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expansion  than  the EC.  Such sectors  include wheat  and poultry, 
where  the  US  agricultural interests have  filed Trade Act complaints 
(Section  301)  with USTR; 
- EC  agricultural exports,  as  a  percentage of world agricultural 
trade,  have risen from  10%  to 11%  between  1971  and  1980 while 
the  US  share went  from  14%  to  17%  in the  same  period; 
- finally,  over  the past decade,  the  United States has maintained 
a  growing agricultural trade surplus with the EC  (from  $1.4 
billion in 1971  to about  $7  billion in 1980  and  81) • 
The  CAP  remains  a  critical cog  in the process of European  integration. 
We  have  been taking steps,  however,  to reform the  CAP,  by diminishing 
incentives for  surplus production and reducing  the  amounts  of transfer 
payments  to European  farmers,  not an  easy task in times of depressed 
farm prices and  incomes  in Europe. 
2.  Steel 
Another  area of irritation concerns European steel exports  to the us. 
Massive petitions under  anti-dumping  and  countervailing duty statutes 
have  been filed by  the American steel industry against producers  in 
seven member-states of  the European  Community,  covering virtually all 8 
EC  steel exports. 
The  US  steel producers  claim that European  countries are  subsidizing 
their steel exports.  Our  view is that the steel industry's difficulties 
should be ascribed to the worsening  of  the  US  economic  situation 
which,  in particular,  led to a  spectacular drop  in the demand  for 
steel on  the American market. 
The  35%  rise in the value of the dolar  since early 1981,  against 
major  European  currencies,made steel imports very attractive on  the 
US  market where prices are still much  higher  than  in the  EC  or Japan. 
The  filing of  these petitions will create  a  high degree of uncertainty 
among  European steel producers,  who  will hesitate to export,  thus 
creating more difficulties in a  seriously troubled industry in Europe. 
?• 
These  complaints filed by  the  US  steel industry constitute a  form of 
harassment to us. 
- we  are concerned that the American Administration rejected 
so few cases to be filed with the  ITC; 
- some  of the cases were  filed against steel producers  which 
exported very small  - or even  no  - quantities of  steel products 
to the US.  (example":  cases were  filed against France  for  cold-
rolled carbon strip,  which  was  not imported in the  US  in 1981, 
and against Belgium and  Luxembourg  for exporting  60  tons  of 
hot-rolled carbon  strip,O.Ol%  of  US  market); 9 
- the fact that the  ITC  recently rejected over half of  the 
industry's complaints gives credence to the European position. 
3.  Reciprocity 
Proposals  to enact "reciprocity"  legislation to ensure  equal access  for 
US  goods  to foreign markets not only challenge the rules of interna-
tional  trade as  they have  evolved over the past twenty years, 
but risk provoking worldwide  counter-measures. 
Several bills have  been  introduced  in the  US  Congress.  My  understan-
ding is that the  US  Administration is sympathetic  to the objectives 
of  the  legislation,  although it opposes  its implementation if it 
contravenes  US  obligations under  GATT. 
While  the  legislation is allegedly aimed principally at certain 
countries other than  the EC,  it could have  a  potentially significant 
impact  on  US-EC  commercial relations. 
Reciprocity constitutes a  serious threat to the unconditional most 
favored  nation principle of  GATT  on  which post-war  trade and prosperity 
were built. 
4.  Interest rates 
Just a  word  about  a  recent - but not  new  - transatlantic economic 
problem.  High  US  interest rates have  become,  once  again,  a  cause 
of  concern for  European  governments  and  financial officials.  The 10 
interdependence of our  economies  and monetary systems  have  made  the 
projected high  US  budget deficits and  high interest rates a  matter 
of  concern in Europe. 
In recent weeks,  we  have  seen  a  number  of  US  administration officials 
suggest  that the  impact of  US  interest rates on  European  economies 
has  been greatly exaggerated and that European  budget deficits rather 
than  US  deficits have  been putting demands  on  the international pool 
of credit and  on  interest rates. 
While it is true that European public-sector deficits have  averaged 
more  than  2%  of  GNP  over the last decade,  and  the  US  average  has 
been closer to  1%,  the Europeans  never  had  trouble financing  them 
before  US  rates hit record highs starting in 1979,  due  to the much 
higher European savings rate. 
A major  cause of Western Europe's  lengthy recession is unquestionably 
the  burden placed on  European  economies  by  the  large increase in the 
value of  energy imports  (1.8%  of  GNP  in 1973  to  4%  in 1981). 
While  the United States certainly cannot be  held responsible for  the 
recession in Europe,  there is some  evidence that the  recent monetary 
instability reflected in overly high interest rates and  considerable 
variation in the  exchange  rates has  worsened  the economic crisis and 
impeded  economic  recovery on  the European  side of the Atlantic.  A 
projected extremely modest recovery -- 1.9%  real growth  in 1982 
from  last year's overall decline in output assumes  a  strong upturn 
in the  US  economy  in the  second half of  1982. 11 
While it ob~ously true that Europe's  economic ills are not the 
fault or the responsibility of  the United States,- it cannot be 
denied that four-fifths of  the world's monetary reserves are 
currently held in dollars  and  that this dominant position of the 
dollar creates certain special obligations on  the part of  US  monetary 
authorities.  The  exchange rate volatility that we  have  recently been 
subjected to  tends  to discourage  investment and  growth and  represents 
a  substantial barrier to international trade.  The  real cost of the 
present situation is that decision-makers  in the field of  investment 
and  trade  seem to have  to concentrate  on  trying to guess exchange-rate 
movements  rather  than  improving production processes,  inventing 
new  products,  and  seeking  new  markets. 
Finally,  failure to achieve  some  measure of economic  growth  could add 
fuel to protectionist pressures in Europe. 
5.  Challenges for  the future 
I  would  have  liked to leave you  with an  upbeat assessment of our 
economic  relationship.  I  am  not sure  I  can  do  so. 
My  feeling is that things may  even  get worse  before they get better. 
Over  the  long run,  our  common  interests and  shared heritage will help 
us  surmount whatever  problems  come  between us.  Our  common  interests 
are the maintenance of  an open world  economic  system,  recovery of  the 
world  economy,  and  a  return to prosperity. 12 
At  the  same  time,  however,  it is quite clear that we  have  disagreements 
on  how  to carry out our foreign economic policies.  Reconciling the 
needs  of particular domestic  industrial and agricultural sectors is 
not an easy thing to do  for  the authorities on either side of  the 
Atlantic. 
International bilateral and multilateral exchanges  and  consultations 
are  the best means  by  which  we  can attempt to resolve  some  of  these 
problems. 
As  in the past,  it will be  indispensable to  surmount momentary 
disagreements  to achieve what are essentially common  objectives. 
Keeping  an  unprejudiced eye on what our ultimate,  compatible, 
interests are  is perhaps  the only way  in which  we  can weather  these 
latest altercations in US-European  economic  relations. 